

SECRET

25X1

## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #6689-81  
21 October 1981MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : [REDACTED]  
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

25X1

SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE  
(Meeting held on 20 October 1981) [REDACTED]

25X1

1. Poland

A. Summary: Based on what we know so far, we can only say that the 16 - 18 October CC plenum has simultaneously upheld the moderate Kania-Jaruzelski line and placed its proponents under greater pressure to regain control of the country.

B. Recent Developments: The CC plenum decision to remove Kania show both the demoralization and the disunity existing within the Party, a situation which Jaruzelski must try to rectify. Although he will probably move cautiously he may eventually see no alternative but to declare a state of emergency. His course of action will be partly dependent on Solidarity actions. Unfortunately, winter will probably worsen the economic problems and may bring about further polarization in the country, which could lead to the emergency declaration. We still have no good information about how and why the leadership change was made. Although Jaruzelski emerged on top, his own moderate line probably has suffered through the loss of his ally Kania. He may also have to contend with factionalism in the military.

C. Future Developments: Several forthcoming events may give us a better feel for the future:

- 1) Regime response to ongoing crises: So far there has been no evident change of policy.
- 2) Further leadership changes either in the government or in the military: It will be important to see whether new appointees are associated with Jaruzelski or not.

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

NFAC #6689-81  
21 October 1981SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EF  
(Meeting held on 20 October 1981) [ ]

25X1

3) Any decisions made by parliament.

4) Political and military preparations for Martial Law:  
So far we know that the government has improved its capabilities to act but believe that Jaruzelski is still not convinced that it would work; continued campaign to prepare the population and the troops for Martial Law as well as any signs of government confidence that it could work would be important indicators.

D. Economy: The situation is likely to get worse before it gets better. In the short run any economic reforms will add to the problem. On the question of credits, the government must pay back some seven hundred million dollars of interest by the end of 1981 and faces another meeting with its Western creditors next week (27 - 29 October).

E. Soviet Reaction: The Soviets have expressed satisfaction at Jaruzelski's election but it remains to be seen whether they continue their campaign for the Polish government to take tough action against Solidarity. Their handling of economic assistance may be an indicator.

25X1

[ ]  
2. Middle East

Soviet Prospects after the Sadat Assassination: The Soviets will continue to press for a greater role in the Middle East. Their position in Egypt cannot get worse and may get better. So far they have concentrated their fire on the United States for its alleged meddling and are probably still assessing how to act in Egypt. They may soon try to get a better feel for Mubarak's foreign policy by trying to reappoint an Ambassador to Cairo. Some important forthcoming events which will help determine how the Soviets act are the US resolution of the AWACS issue, the results of the Hussein visit to the US (2 - 4 November), and finally the April 1982 Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai which will give Egypt greater freedom of action. It is very likely that the Soviets will keep up a steady barrage of criticism of the Bright Star exercise and will show their support of Libya by demonstrative but largely symbolic military actions. [ ]

25X1

25X1

SECRET

**Page Denied**